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Introduction
The international natural gas markets are in turmoil: on the one hand, the price rollercoaster is continuing, leading from the low prices of the mid-1990s to record levels in 2008, and then dropping sharply again in the wake of the world economic crisis and oversupplies. It is still open whether natural gas will really become the "transition" energy source on the way to a low-carbon world (e.g. hydrogen economy). Thus, while many gas-fired power plants forecasted around the turn of the decade have been shelved (Stern, 2007) , their competitiveness has recovered recently in the wake of the global climate policy debate, and concerns about coal-fired power plants. However, natural gas still spurs various concerns about future reliable supplies, industry concentration, and supply security (Stern, 2007; Victor, Jaffe and Hayes, 2006) . It comes as no surprise to see diverging forecasts for natural gas supply, demand and prices even for the short-term future. The official forecast for natural gas demand in Europe has been significantly reduced (European Commission, 2007) ; the Energy Information Agency (EIA, 2009a) has drastically decreased its forecast of U.S. LNG import requirements. The crystal ball remains highly intransparent.
In this paper, we provide a balanced discussion of the perspectives of the world natural gas trade until 2030. We specify a "base case" which defines the business-as-usual assumptions based on forecasts of the world energy markets. We then investigate the sensitivity of supply and prices by simulating a number of scenarios regarding the future development of the natural gas market. The simulation results from the scenario runs provide insights into trends, sensitivities as well as resiliency in the global natural gas market until 2030.
We distinguish two types of scenarios, global and regional ones. To understand how global developments could affect the natural gas markets, we implement potential "game changer" scenarios and we start with the most recent trend: i) the emergence of large unconventional natural gas reserves in North America (and in the future perhaps in other regions of the world), mainly shale gas, and its impact on international trade and prices.
Other, global scenarios include ii) tightly constrained reserves, and iii) a CO 2 -constraint and the emergence of a competing environment-friendly "backstop technology". Further scenarios focusing on regional trends are: iv) the full halt of Russian and Caspian exports towards Western Europe, v) sharply constrained production and export activities in the Arab Gulf, vi) heavily increasing demand for natural gas in China and India, and finally vii) constraints on LNG infrastructure development in the Western US. Our results show significant changes in production, consumption, traded volumes and prices. Investments in pipelines, LNG terminals and storage are also strongly affected. However, overall the world natural gas industry is resilient to local disturbances and can compensate local supply disruptions with natural gas from other sources. Long-term supply security does not seem to be at risk.
The paper is structured in the following way: the next section describes our analytical tool, the World Gas Model (WGM) and the data upon which our analysis relies. We then sketch out the base case, that we have calibrated such as to follow the Primes and Poles forecasts for Europe and the world, respectively, as closely as possible (Section 3). Sections 4 to 7 each describe one of the important, global scenarios in detail: the reassessment of natural gas reserves and production capacity in North America, the production reduction due to constrained reserves, the advent of a climate friendly, carbon-constraining policy and Russia diverting trade to the East (i.e. Asia) and to North America instead of supplying Europe.
Section 8 gives an overview of the results of other scenarios: they focus on a supply shock in the Middle East; on an exploding demand from China and India; and on a continued NIMBYpolicy pursued in California vis-à-vis LNG imports. For each scenario, we identify the effect on prices, quantities produced, traded, and consumed -both at a general level and at the level of individual countries and regions. In Section 9 we summarize the key results and conclude that globally medium-and long-term supply security should not be of major concern, though local effects are significant.
Model and Data

The World Gas Model
The World Gas Model (WGM) is a simulation model of the global natural gas market covering the next three decades. It includes more than 80 countries and covers 95% of global natural gas production and consumption. The WGM allows for endogenous investment in pipelines and storage as well as expansion of regasification and liquefaction capacities and takes into account demand growth, production capacity expansions and price and production cost increase. Considering the game-theoretic aspects of the natural gas market, the model also includes market power à la Nash-Cournot for some players participating in natural gas trade, the traders and regasifiers. Egging et al. (2008) provide a detailed description of the one-period model without investments. Players in the model are producers, pipeline traders, liquefiers, regasifiers, storage operators, marketers (implicitly) and consumers in three sectors, namely residential/commercial, industry, and power generation. The consumers are taken into account via their aggregate inverse demand function. All other players are modeled via their respective profit maximization problems under some specific operational or technical constraints. The players with infrastructure constraints can expand the capacities and decide on the optimal investment in a net-present value maximization over the entire model horizon, assuming perfect foresight. We derive a mixed complementarity (Facchinei and Pang, 2003) with market-clearing conditions linking the players' problems. There is usually one producer and one trader per country; only the US, Canada, and Russia are divided into several regions due to their geographic scope and importance in the world market. Pipelines, liquefiers and regasifiers are included as of today, but there is ample leeway in the model for new pipelines and LNG capacities to be built when the model considers them economically viable.
While the role of producers, liquefiers, regasifiers and storage is intuitive, the traders are more specific: they act as marketing arm of "their" producer via the pipeline grid.
Modeling producers and traders as separate entities allows to distinguish between production and trade activities; it is also in line with recent regulatory initiatives, namely the "unbundling" of vertically integrated energy companies. Examples of traders in today's natural gas marketplace include Gazexport for Gazprom (Russia) or GasTerra for NAM (The Netherlands). Depending on their origin and location of operation, traders may have market power; this means that they are in a position to withhold supplies in a respective market and thereby increase prices in order to maximize their profits.
In addition to the possibility to export by pipeline, producers can export the natural gas as liquefied natural gas (LNG). To this end, the producer sells the natural gas to a liquefier (in the same country node) who can sell it to any regasifier in the world. The LNG market today is characterized by a large amount of contracted sales, that imply that liquefiers have committed to sell a minimum amount of natural gas while possibly fixing the regasifier. We include LNG contracts known as of today (2008) 
Data and calibration
The model is calibrated to projections of the future energy markets, namely PRIMES forecasts for Europe (European Commission, 2007) and POLES forecasts for the rest of the world (European Commission, 2006) . These sources are used to determine the (exogenous) production capacities and the reference consumption quantities and prices of the demand functions for each period and country. POLES projections reflect a worldwide increase in natural gas production and consumption by 70% in 2030 relative to 2005. Overall, demand is projected to stagnate or even decline in most countries after 2025.
While the PRIMES and POLES forecasts have the advantage of being widely accepted forecasts, we have not been able to verify some of the underlying assumptions. In particular, it seems that reserve estimates and the forecasts of natural gas production are optimistic. For this reason, we examine the effects of reserve constraints on the global gas trade in one scenario ("In the ground scenario", Section 5) and compare the results to the base case which does not include finite reserve horizons for the producers (Section 3)..
The calibrated worldwide base case consumption (production) 4 in 2005 is 2368 (2435), and 3757 (3905) bcm in 2030, and results in an average wholesale price of $375 per 1000 m³.
We assume an average yearly price increase of 3%, in accordance with PRIMES projections.
For infrastructure capacities (pipelines, LNG liquefaction and regasification terminals, storage), project and company information from various sources has been employed (e.g., Oil
and Gas Journal, GSE database at www.gte.be). This information was used to include existing additional capacities since 2005 and also considered when assessing the maximum allowable capacity expansions per period for the base case.
Base Case
The base case follows general assumptions provided by the literature on the development of the natural gas market. These include a steady increase of natural gas production over the whole period that is reflected in our results by a total global production level of about 3,900 bcm/y (3,700 bcm/y of consumption after the subtraction of losses) in 2030 ( Figure 1 ).
We assume a yearly price increase of 3% (in real 2005 US-Dollars). LNG trade grows until 2020 and then reaches a plateau close to 600 bcm/y. At that moment, LNG will account for approximately 15% of total natural gas production. The amount of natural gas consumed in its production countries drops from 60% to about 50% of total consumption, while the share of natural gas exported by pipeline remains relatively stable (30%). In other words, the international trade of natural gas and the share of LNG in the trade volumes will increase. further from 491 to 945 bcm/y. Thus, we continue to observe proportionally higher regasification capacity than liquefaction capacity reflecting the flexible spot LNG trade assumed, at least for later model runs. There are certain spare volumes in order to meet seasonal demand or to benefit from the option of importing additional volumes of liquefied natural gas. Investment in LNG infrastructure is strongest at the beginning of the time horizon and again in 2020; after that, investments decrease due to the assumption of demand and at the low costs that are predicted by some sources, the share of LNG in the North American supplies is likely to be much lower than indicated by our results, see the next scenario "Barnett Shale". stagnation in many developed markets and the short model horizon left for amortization of the investment costs.
Barnett Shale
In the first scenario, the impact of the recent reassessment of the natural gas reserve situation in North America is investigated . While the exact size of recoverable resources from unconventional shale formations is still unclear, the discoveries will certainly lead to higher natural gas production in North America over the coming decades compared to earlier estimates. The current state of the reassessment EIA (2009b) is incorporated in this scenario by assuming higher production capacities in most US regions and Canada from 2010 on.
Since marginal production costs in the WGM are a function of total production capacity, an increase in capacity leads to lower costs for the same quantity of natural gas produced.
The effects of the "Barnett Shale" scenario are significant: while North America imports more than 40% of its natural gas consumption in 2030 in the base case, the increase in production capacity with shale gas allows North America to rely on natural gas imports for less than 20% of its consumption in 2030 . At the same time, total consumption in the region is 8% higher compared to the base case due to larger natural gas availability and lower prices.
The impact of the production capacity shift is most pronounced in the early periods, with The price increase comes together with a rise of the share of imports in consumption. In 2030, North America and Europe satisfy less than 30% of their consumption from domestic production, but both rely on a wide array of external suppliers. North America's imports are primarily LNG from different producers. Europe, on the other hand, continues to rely largely on pipeline imports, which are complemented by LNG imports from a variety of sources.
Post Bali Planet
We now want to examine the advent of an alternative more climate-friendly energy source and that can potentially be substituted for natural gas in consumption. It does not matter, for the sake of our study, whether the backstop energy source is wind, solar, biomass or any other. The important characteristic is rather that the cost of using the alternative energy source is too high in the early years to substitute for natural gas, but is assumed to become economically viable over the next decades. We assume that the backstop technology can substitute for all applications of natural gas, including heating and transportation and that it is provided at a marginal cost price (i.e., no strategic behavior by the backstop technology supplier). As one would expect, the backstop technology is first introduced in those regions where natural gas wholesale prices are highest, namely in North America and parts of Asia.
This reduces the total demand for natural gas and, hence, globally leads to lower prices.
Europe produces more natural gas domestically and at the same time benefits from reduced prices in the LNG markets, which induces countries like Algeria to revert to pipeline export to Europe instead of selling LNG to North America. As a consequence, Europe only starts to use the backstop technology relatively late, in spite of its large consumption and high dependency on natural gas (see Figure 9 ). In the scenario, the backstop technology accounts for 15% of energy consumption in 2030 in those sectors which traditionally rely on natural gas. Figure 10 shows that the introduction of a backstop technology leads to a noteworthy decline of wholesale prices compared to the base case (we show the example of Asia, trends in other regions being similar). At the same time the level of energy use, meaning natural gas consumption plus backstop technology, is well above the consumption levels in the base case.
The backstop technology therefore leads to a substantial increase of consumer welfare, both because of lower prices and due to more available energy sources. This scenario investigates the effects of a politically motivated move by Russia to stop all exports to Europe -both its own sales and those of other countries passing through Russian territory, e.g., from the Caspian region. The interruption is assumed to start in 2015. In this scenario, Ukraine is treated as part of Europe, i.e. it suffers from the Russian supply disruption, unlike Belarus. We want to investigate the adjustment strategies by the European importers to the supply stop from the East.
European countries are immediately hit by the supply disturbance, with a 40% price spike in 2015 compared to the base case. Consumption is reduced by more than 12% (521 bcm/y instead of 596 bcm/y). Since Finland and the Baltic states would not receive any natural gas imports after 2010, we allow for the construction of two new pipelines from
Norway via Sweden to these countries. These pipelines are constructed between 2015 and 2020, with a capacity of 7 bcm/y to the Baltic states and 4 bcm/y to Finland. Still, the price impact of the Russian export stop is significant in both countries, with prices almost twice as high compared to the base case.
However, after the first shock, European natural gas demand picks up again ( Figure   11 ) and a broad diversification of imports can be observed. Holz et al. (2009) American Atlantic coast will increase significantly (+350% to 30 bcm/y instead of 6.4 bcm/y) to make up for the diversion of shipments from the Middle East.
Total Russian natural gas production decreases by about 15%, which translates into a reduction of its profits (summed over producer, trader and liquefiers in the Russian nodes) by more than 40% compared to the base case results. It can therefore be concluded that the politically motivated supply disruption comes with a hefty price tag attached for the Russian state. 
Shutting off the Middle East
In this section, we summarize the assumptions and the main results of three additional scenarios, focusing on regional trends and developments. In the scenario "Shutting off the
Middle East", we study the impact of a supply shock in the Middle East. This scenario can also be interpreted as the result of a GECF (Gas Exporting Countries Forum) cartel, similar to OPEC in the oil market. Producers in the Middle East may choose to deliberately under-invest in their production capacity to exert upward pressure on prices. 6 Whereas in the base case, production capacity increases considerably in the region, in this scenario we hold production capacity constant for all producers from the year 2010 on. Total natural gas production in 2030 drops from 3905 to 3707 bcm/y.
Freezing production capacity in the Arab Gulf countries leads to a significant welfare loss for that region. Evaluating net profits in the time frame under investigation (revenue minus production and investment costs for producers, traders and liquefiers in each country, 2005 to 2030) shows a 7% decline as compared to the base case for the whole region. The negative effect of the strong reduction of quantities on profits is partly compensated by positive impact of the price increase. However, due to the higher prices, regional consumer welfare surplus is reduced over the same horizon by almost 25%. We therefore conclude that the total halt of capacity expansions would not be optimal neither for the producers nor the consumers in the Middle East. 
Tiger and dragon
The "tiger and dragon" scenario investigates the impact of a strong demand increase in Asia.
We focus on China and India since uncertainty about the future natural gas demand in these two developing countries is significant. (2020) to India, with expansions in later periods.
Natural gas prices increase slightly in all world regions mirroring the global impact of the strong Asian demand increase.
The Middle East as a region delivering already today to all major LNG importing regions (i.e. Europe, Asia-Pacific and North America) changes its export pattern significantly.
Even though its domestic consumption in 2030 is only slightly lower than in the base case, LNG deliveries to Europe and North America decrease by 20% and 47% respectively; exports to Asia increase by 40%.
Traded volumes and wholesale prices under this scenario underline that the uncertainty about future Asian demand levels for energy sources can have a significant impact on forecasts of the whole world natural gas market structure; a demand growth increase by a factor of 2.5 results in LNG volumes redirected from Europe and North America to Asian importers and overall higher natural gas prices.
Pretty coast California
This last scenario discusses a situation with specific regional effects. Since US domestic natural gas production was for a long time and until recently expected to decline in the nearterm, the country with the second largest consumption worldwide may be increasingly dependent on imports. These imports can only partially be satisfied by deliveries from Whereas in the base case 42 bcm/y of regasification capacity are built on the US Pacific coast alone, in the "pretty coast" scenario, LNG import capacities increase in Western Canada, Mexico and at the US Gulf coast. 8 The price effect on California is negligible; the prohibition of US Pacific coast LNG import facilities actually results in lower prices in the short run compared to the base case. This can be explained by the rapid and significant expansion of the pipeline from Mexico in 2015; in the base case, this pipeline is not expanded since LNG import capacities come online in 2020 and the pipeline expansion is therefore not economically viable. In the long-run, however, the lack of LNG import capacity leads to lower supplies and natural gas prices rise by approximately 4 % compared to the base case.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper presents simulation results of different structural and regional natural gas market scenarios using the World Gas Model. Table 3 summarizes the scenario assumptions, main results and conclusions of the six scenarios and selected key figures for the global natural gas trade in the year 2030. In the first scenario, the recent reassessment of the North American natural gas reserves, namely the availability of large amounts of modestly priced unconventional gas, mainly shale gas, is examined. Higher production capacity and lower production costs mean that North America depends to a far lesser extent on LNG imports from other regions. Assuming that a substantial level of production capacity will come online soon, prices in the next years will actually remain modest in the next years in North America.
Taking into account limited natural gas reserves, on the other hand, leads to higher prices in North America compared to the base case, while Europe is not significantly affected.
However, Europe would be reliant on a small number of suppliers, raising worries about diversification and security of supply. The introduction of an alternative energy source, in the wake of the discussion about global warming and CO 2 emissions, could lead to significantly lower consumption of natural gas and, at the same time, lower the prices and therefore increase consumer surplus globally. While North America and some Asian countries rapidly introduce this new technology, Europe only starts using it moderately in 2025. In a more politically motivated framework, we examine the disruption of Russian natural gas exports to Europe in 2015. Average prices increase by 40% in Europe in the year of the disruption, and continue on a price trajectory approximately 25% above the base case, with consumption around 10% lower. Russia does not, as one might expect, increase its exports to Asia; instead, it ships more LNG to North America after the supply disruption to Europe.
9 Share of LNG in global natural gas consumption A supply shock in the Middle East, on the other hand, would lead to higher prices worldwide. The effects are strongest in the Middle East itself, with export revenue and consumer surplus significantly lower than in the base case. The remaining supplies from the Middle East are directed almost exclusively to Asia, while Africa and Russia fill the gap in the supply to Europe and North America.Since there is a lot of uncertainty about how Asia will satisfy its hunger for energy, one scenario studies the impact of much higher growth rates of natural gas consumption in India and China. This leads the Middle East, Australia and South East Asia to divert some of their LNG exports from Europe and North America to these two countries, with world natural gas prices increasing slightly. The last scenario focuses on a ban on LNG regasification investments on the US Pacific Coast. Then prices may actually fall in the short run due to the availability of other import options (e.g., LNG re-exports from Mexico); in the long run prices are slightly higher compared to the base case, which does not have these investment restrictions.
For future research, there are more scenarios worth investigating: what would happen, for instance, if demand decreased significantly, due to a worldwide CO 2 emission trading scheme or a rebound of coal if carbon capture and sequestration proves to be economically feasible?
Currently, the formation of an effective cartel out of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, similar to OPEC in oil markets, is also discussed broadly. From a modeling perspective, there are certain limitations in investigating such a scenario. Egging, Holz, Hirschhausen, and Gabriel (2009) provide a first step in this direction, but more research is needed to compare different types of collusion of the producers. The WGM can also be extended to include stochasticity, e.g. in future demand projections, production capacities and supply disruptions.
No stochastic scenarios have yet been investigated but given the high uncertainty of energy consumption projections in general and the use of natural gas in particular, stochastic scenarios might yield further insight into the future development of the global natural gas market.
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